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I’m not accusing lawyers of having the morals of the market place.1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1916, Julius Henry Cohen produced a readable and thoughtful 
book with the provocative title of The Law: Business or Profession?2  
 
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.  I am very grateful to the organizers 
and presenters at the Law or Business symposium and the Boston College Brownbag 
Series participants for providing valuable feedback on this essay.   Particular thanks 
go to Paul Tremblay, Michael Cassidy and Denis Brion for sharing their insights on 
this topic and to Sean Wall (BC Law 2014) for his excellent research assistance. 
Finally, grateful thanks to the Boston College Law School Fund for its generous 
support.   
 1. Post from Legal Ethics Discussion List (Mar. 22, 2012) (email on file with 
author). 
 2. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? (1916). 
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He describes a legal profession and society in flux, confronted with 
some very familiar challenges, including the pressures of the market, 
the increased specialization of lawyers, and changing social conditions 
such as a large influx of immigrants.3  The facts he marshals could be 
rewoven to tell many different stories.4 
Cohen chose to frame a dichotomy that has continued for over 100 
years: is law a business or a profession?  In his 1916 work, Cohen 
gives some credit to businesses that strive to enhance the 
professionalism and ethics of their business enterprises,5 but it 
becomes clear that business is the lower standard of the marketplace, 
less constrained—or unconstrained—by other social or professional 
concerns.6 
For the purposes of this Article, I will use the word 
“professionalism” to capture these additional social and professional 
concerns, the particular obligations that lawyers owe to their clients 
and society: fiduciary obligations to clients, adherence to core values 
such as confidentiality and maintaining confidences, and an 
understanding of the lawyer’s role to both support and improve our 
system of justice and to use best efforts to address unmet legal needs.  
Unfortunately, the rhetorical device of framing the question as 
“profession versus business,” thereby characterizing the two as 
inherently inconsistent concepts, seriously impairs our ability to 
address some of the central challenges to lawyers fulfilling these 
important values and indeed contributes to these failings.  This 
framing of profession versus business disparages the business aspects 
of legal services that are essential to implementing our professional 
obligations. 
I will focus on three current professionalism challenges in the U.S. 
legal profession: (i) the problem of neglect, poor client 
communication, and poor management of client funds; (ii) the need 
to improve the ethical infrastructures in practice settings to enhance 
both routine practice and ethical decision-making when lawyers 
confront ethical challenges; and (iii) the challenge of providing legal 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. One could use Cohen’s facts to discuss the cultural construction of the 
lawyer’s role through an international and comparative analysis or professionalism as 
closing ranks. Id. at 44–80. 
 5. Id. at 173–200 (discussing advertising). 
 6. Id. at 73 (discussing business aspects of the legal profession in Russia as “a 
sort of indicia of what our own Bar could do if it were to be lowered to ‘business’ 
standards”). 
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services to the poor and working class.  For each, it turns out that 
improving adherence to core values requires not just training lawyers 
to internalize a model of professionalism,7 and a continuing 
commitment to self-regulation in some form, but also implementing 
improved business practices.  In other words, a significant part of our 
failures as a profession are business failures.  These failures occur at 
the individual, firm, and market levels, and at each level we need to 
consider the business structures that enhance or impair improved 
practices.   
Business—good business—is not the enemy of lawyers but an 
important tool to implement our service profession.8  We need to 
have a sharper and richer discussion of the business perspective of 
professional practice, without apologies, if we want to improve the 
professional practice of U.S. lawyers.9  In addition, a stronger 
interdisciplinary conversation with the field of business ethics would 
help break down the stereotype of business as an amoral, or immoral, 
enterprise.  We must envision business as both a partner and a tool to 
achieve our larger social goals.10 
I.  PROBLEM ONE: THE DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE—NEGLECT, 
POOR CLIENT COMMUNICATION AND IMPROPER MANAGEMENT 
OF CLIENT FUNDS 
The legal profession embraces the idea of competent 
representation, the opening requirement set out in ABA Model Rule 
 
 7. This phrase “internalize a model of professionalism” should be read broadly 
to refer to individual constructs of how to make right decisions.  Lawyers might also 
embrace a model of virtue ethics. See generally R. Michael Cassidy, Character and 
Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to 
“Seek Justice,” 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635 (2006). 
 8. Some commentators see a risk of the increasing characterization of law as a 
service profession. See Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal 
Profession: The Impact of Treating the Legal Profession as “Service Providers,” 2008 
PROF. LAW. 189. 
 9. In her analysis of Australian regulation of lawyers, Prof. Christine Parker 
observes, “traditional legal ethics artificially assumes that since the practice of law is 
a profession, it cannot also be a business.  Both these assumptions make for a short-
sighted and potentially dangerously ineffective regulatory regime and ethical culture 
for legal practice.” Christine Parker, Law Firms Incorporated: How Incorporation 
Could and Should Make Firms More Ethically Responsible, 23 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 
347, 348 (2004). 
 10. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce & Brendan Michael Wilson, Business Ethics, in 
ECONOMICS OF PHILANTHROPY, RECIPROCITY AND SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
(forthcoming) (on file with author). 
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of Professional Conduct 1.1.11  Implementing competent 
representation requires diligence and communication.12  Yet the 
largest category of the disciplinary actions nationwide, roughly thirty 
percent, deals with issues of competence, diligence and failure to 
communicate with the client.13  The next most common basis for 
disciplinary action is mismanagement of client property or funds, 
which account for roughly twelve percent.14  Some of the mishandling 
of client funds comes from venality and outright theft.  But quite a bit 
comes from poor business practices, such as commingling client and 
office funds.15 
It does not take much analysis to identify that more than a third of 
the disciplinary actions against lawyers involve some aspect of 
business failure.16  Of course these are deeply intertwined with other 
issues, such as substance abuse, depression, and adult attention deficit 
disorder.17  Whatever the causes, the inability of some lawyers to 
implement a fundamental and sound business principle of service and 
competence is the most common problem for clients.18 
To deal with this professionalism failure, the organized bar has 
taken a multi-tiered approach.  All states now have lawyer assistance 
 
 11. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2010) (“A lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client.  Competent representation requires the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.”). 
 12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2010) (diligence); id. at R. 1.4 
(2010) (competence). 
 13. See Patricia W. Hatamyar & Kevin M. Simmons, Are Women More Ethical 
Lawyers? An Empirical Study, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 785, 811 (2004) (in a 
nationwide study of disciplinary actions in 2000, the two most common categories 
were “competence or diligence,” which was the basis for 1154 or 17% of complaints 
nationwide, and “communications with client,” which was the basis for 933 
complaints, or 14% of all disciplinary actions). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See, e.g., In re Nowak, No. 496,2010, 2010 WL 3699843, at *7 (Del. Sept. 22, 
2010) (“Respondent’s conduct can be characterized as a ‘sustained and systematic 
failure to exercise even a modicum of diligence with respect to his recordkeeping.’”); 
see also id. at *9 (no evidence of dishonest or selfish motive). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See generally Rachel Tarko Hudson, Pick Your Poison: Abuse of Legal 
Versus Illegal Substances as Mitigation in Attorney Disciplinary Cases, 22 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 911, 911 (2009) (“[S]ome jurisdictions estimate that anywhere from 
twenty-seven to seventy percent of attorney disciplinary cases involve some form of 
substance abuse.”); Kelly Cahill Timmons, Disability-Related Misconduct and the 
Legal Profession: The Role of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 69 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 609 (2008). 
 18. See Leslie Griffin, A Client’s Theory of Professionalism, 52 EMORY L.J. 1087 
(2003). 
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programs to address alcohol and drug abuse, which is a significant 
source of client neglect.19  The alcohol and drug initiatives have grown 
to include a range of lawyer wellness issues, such as efforts to assist 
lawyers confronted with compassion fatigue, compulsive behaviors, 
depression, stress, and suicide.20  As programs expand they 
increasingly provide services relating to cognitive impairments, aging, 
financial, marital, and career issues.21 
Professor Fred Zacharias courageously articulated the inherent 
tension of providing confidential assistance to lawyers suffering from 
drug and alcohol problems and the goals of client protection.22  The 
clients are typically not the focus of the initial assistance.23  Benefits 
hopefully flow to future clients.24 
At the same time we have seen a growth of lawyer assistance 
programs, we have also seen an increasing focus on law practice 
management.  In 1974, the ABA created the Law Practice 
Management Section to assist lawyers in the business of law, 
recognizing that good business models are needed to “make the legal 
services delivery team more effective, competent, ethical, and 
responsive to the needs of clients and the public.”25  Their Solo and 
Small Firm Resource Center is aimed at the practice setting with a 
disproportionately large number of complaints to the bar.26  
 
 19. See generally Commission on Lawyer Assistance Programs, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/lawyer_assistance.html (last visited Dec. 17, 
2012). 
 20. Along with “alcohol abuse & dependency” and “drug abuse & dependency,” 
these are topics that the ABA Commission on LAP focuses upon. See id. 
 21. AM. BAR ASS’N, 2010 COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF LAWYER ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAMS (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/legalservices/colap/downloads/20110311_aba_2010_colap_comprehensive_s
urvey.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 22. Fred C. Zacharias, A Word of Caution for Lawyer Assistance Programming, 
18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 243–46 (2004). 
 23. Id. at 241–43. 
 24. Id. at 244 n.27. 
 25. Law Practice Management Section: About Us, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_practice_management/about_us.html (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2012). 
 26. See Mark Hansen, Picking on the Little Guy: Perception Lingers that 
Discipline Falls Hardest on Solos, Small Firms, 89 A.B.A. J. 30, 32-34 (2003) 
(discussing studies that indicate that solo and small firm attorneys are disciplined 
more frequently than attorneys at large firms); Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less 
Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 6-8 (2007) (secrecy in 
lawyer discipline impairs ability to assess whether there is bias against solo and small 
firm practitioners); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Comparative Perspectives on Lawyer 
Regulation: An Agenda for Reform in the United States and Canada, 80 FORDHAM 
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Literature from the practicing bar addresses this topic, and even the 
academics are getting into the discussion.27  Consulting practices also 
advise firms on improving business practices.28 
These initiatives have hit the law schools.  Many law schools 
provide information on lawyer assistance programs before students 
even enter the legal profession.29  The increasing attention to skills 
training in U.S. law schools should include, in the words of the 1991 
MacCrate Report, “organization and management of legal work.”30  
Good texts have emerged to introduce students to the business of 
lawyering and have supported the growth of law practice 
management courses.31  By 2007, 61 law schools offered some course 
in law practice management (at least according to the law school’s’ 
websites).32  In 2010, 107 individuals listed themselves as law office 
management teachers, including legal ethics leaders such as Thomas 
Shaffer, David Wilkins, Steven Hobbs, Gary Munneke, Clark 
Cunningham, and Debra Moss Curtis.33  The growth of law practice 
management gives students who will move quickly into their own solo 
or small firm practice the tools to act in a professional manner.34  
 
L. REV. 2761, 2775 (2012) (“[In the Canadian disciplinary system] disciplinary 
sanctions tend to disproportionately target lawyers in solo practice or small 
partnerships.”). 
 27. See Debra Moss Curtis, Teaching Law Office Management: Why Law 
Students Need to Know the Business of Being Lawyers, 71 ALB. L. REV. 201 (2008); 
Gary A. Munneke, Managing a Law Practice: What You Need to Learn in Law 
School, 30 PACE L. REV. 1207, 1214–16 (2010) (canvassing practice management 
scholarship). 
 28. See, e.g., ALTMAN WEIL, INC., http://www.altmanweil.com (last visited Nov. 6, 
2012); HBR CONSULTING, http://hbrconsulting.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2012); 
HURON CONSULTING GRP., http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/service.aspx 
?serviceId=635 (last visited Nov. 6, 2012). 
 29. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 21, at 39 (forty-two law assistance programs 
(87.5%) presented to students). 
 30. AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN 
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE 
PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 199 (1992). 
 31. See, e.g., GARY A. MUNNEKE, INTRODUCTION TO LAW PRACTICE:  
MATERIALS AND CASES (3d ed. 2007); THOMAS MCKNIGHT STEELE, MATERIALS AND 
CASES ON LAW PRACTICE MANAGEMENT: A LEARNING TOOL FOR LAW STUDENTS 
(2004). 
 32. Curtis, supra note 27, at 206. 
 33. See ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS, AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 
2010-2011, at 1731–32 (2010). 
 34. See David Barnhizer, Redesigning the American Law School, 2010 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 249, 283 (2010) (“[I]t is reasonable to conclude that the majority of the more 
recent graduates have gone into solo practices for which they are ill-prepared, formed 
associated relationships with others similarly situated to spread operating costs, or 
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Given the anticipated increase in recent graduates hanging up their 
own shingles, such programs will become increasingly important.35 
In addition to lawyer assistance programs and law practice 
management emphasis, the bars have implemented programs that 
directly or indirectly assist the lawyer in improving their business 
practices.36  Some bars have initiated early intervention programs to 
take client complaints and divert them to focus on problem solving 
and prevention, rather than discipline.37  This provides a remedy for 
the current client and assists the lawyer in improving business 
practices to prevent future failures.  As part of professionalism 
initiatives, other states have embraced the transition to practice and 
mentoring programs to assist lawyers in improved business practices.38 
Despite all these efforts, issues of neglect, communication, and 
poor financial accounting continue to be common problems.  From 
discussions with other professional responsibility professors, and a 
review of legal ethics textbooks, it appears that those who teach legal 
ethics spend little time on these issues in a traditional professional 
responsibility course because these are obvious and clear 
obligations.39  This is what Julius Cohen recognized as the disconnect 
 
become vulnerable junior associates in small firms that themselves are operating on 
the margin.”). 
 35. James Leipold, The Employment Profile for the Law School Class of 2011 
May Represent the “Bottom,” in NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT (2012) (noting 
that percentage of new graduates working as solo practitioners has risen from 3.3% 
for the Class of 2008 to 6% for the Class of 2011; percentage of new graduates 
working at firms of 50 or fewer lawyers, including solo practitioners, has reached 
59%); see also R. Michael Cassidy, Beyond Practical Skills: Nine Steps for Improving 
Legal Education Now, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1515, 1515–16 (2012). 
 36. See infra notes 37–38. 
 37. See Levin, supra note 26, at 3–6 (noting that as of 2007, twenty jurisdictions 
had diversion programs and that it is unclear whether they work); Lori Nelson, The 
Diversion Process in Disciplinary Cases: Utah Rule 14-533, 20 UTAH B.J. 9 (2007). 
 38. See, e.g., Melody Finnemore, Meeting Requirements, Meeting Expectations: 
New Lawyers and Mentors Reflect on Year One of the Mentoring Experience, 72 
OR. ST. B. BULL. 26, 27 (2012) (discussing mandatory year long mentorship for new 
Oregon attorneys, and noting that “Oregon’s program is loosely modeled after 
similar programs in Georgia and Utah”); Transition Into Law Practice Program 
(TILPP), ST. B. GA., http://www.gabar.org/membership/tilpp/index.cfm (last visited 
June 19, 2012). 
 39. See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW 
AND ETHICS 896–98 (9th ed. 2012) (according to the index, the 800-plus page text 
spending seven pages on the ethical duty of competence; discussing effective 
assistance of counsel including some issues of competence, such as procedural 
defaults, in a handful of pages); LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL 
PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 296–313 (3d ed. 2012) (900-plus page text 
spending seventeen pages on issues of competence and diligence). 
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between the ideals of the profession and the conduct of its 
members—that is, the gap between theory and practice.40  While 
Cohen accurately asserts that inadequate moral training might 
explain some of the gap,41 moral training does not appear to be the 
issue in this category of problems.  These problems occur because at 
the implementation stage lawyers have trouble with the fundamental 
business aspects of our service profession.  This leads to questions of 
how the systems and structures in which the lawyer functions might 
reduce this category of problems. 
II.  PROBLEM TWO: ETHICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND IMPROVING 
BUSINESS SYSTEMS 
Over the last twenty years we have seen increased attention to the 
need for improving the ethical infrastructure within legal settings.42  
The attention toward ethical infrastructure looks to improve systems 
that will reduce errors, increase compliance with ethical obligations, 
improve ethical decision-making, and enhance access to justice for 
low- and middle-income clients.  The legal profession has made some 
progress in this area, which only sharpens our understanding that 
there is still a long way to go to have practice settings that facilitate 
the core values of competence, ethical decision-making, and access to 
justice. 
A. Regulatory System Incentives to Create Ethical 
Infrastructure 
The regulatory system imposes some responsibilities on supervisors 
and managers.  Under ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.1, 
a partner, and those with comparable managerial authority in a law 
firm, “shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in 
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the 
 
 40. COHEN, supra note 2, at 100. 
 41. Id. (“If we have the pedagogue’s bias, we shall be tempted to believe that lack 
of educational training will explain some of these sharp curves [in the gap between 
ideals and conduct].  And if we are ethicists in philosophy we shall doubtless find 
confirming evidence that absence or presence of moral training accounts for some of 
the declivities.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law 
Influences the “Ethical Infrastructure” of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 245 (1998); 
Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 
(1991); see also Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective 
Ethical Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 691 (2002); infra footnotes 82-84 and accompanying text. 
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firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct,”43 and “[a] lawyer 
having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make 
reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.”44  This includes a duty to take 
“reasonable remedial measures” if the supervisory lawyer learns of 
the conduct “at a time when its consequences can be avoided or 
mitigated.”45  Rule 5.3(a) imposes a parallel duty of both creating 
systems and supervision over non-lawyer assistants.46  This 
supervisory obligation extends to assuring there are internal policies 
and procedures to improve adherence to the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.47 
If the regulatory process had the resources and the political 
support to address root causes of incompetence and neglect, and 
create systems to improve decision-making when lawyers are 
confronted with ethical issues, one can imagine that a vigorous use of 
Rule 5.1 could make a difference.  Sanctions under Rules 5.1 and 5.3, 
however, are less common than other rules violations, but these rules 
are occasionally the source of discipline for poor infrastructure.48  For 
example, the Alabama Supreme Court sanctioned two named 
partners in a firm for, among other acts, failing to create the 
management conditions that would allow associates to provide 
competent service: 
 
 43. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2010). 
 44. Id. R. 5.1(b). 
 45. Id. R. 5.1(c)(2). 
 46. Id. R. 5.3(a). 
 47. Id. R. 5.1 cmt. 2. 
 48. For example, in 2011 the Massachusetts Office of Bar Counsel had only 1 
complaint dealing with inadequate supervision under Rule 5.1 or 5.3. See 
MASSACHUSETTS OFFICE OF THE BAR COUNSEL OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, 
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT: FISCAL YEAR 2011 7 (2011), 
available at http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/fy2011.pdf.  At least in Massachusetts, 
discipline under 5.1 or 5.3 is not for isolated errors that the lawyer could not have 
guarded against or prevented, but for situations where the failure to supervise “was 
persistent or the result of systemic inappropriate office procedures.” Constance V. 
Vecchione, Thy Brother’s Keeper: Disciplinary Liability for Failure to Supervise, 
MASS.GOV (Feb. 1999), http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/supervis.htm.  In Illinois in 
2011, fifty charges of misconduct for failure to supervise subordinates were docketed 
compared to 2378 charges of misconduct for neglect.  Of the failure to supervise 
cases, only four resulted in disciplinary sanctions compared to fifty-seven for neglect. 
See ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF ILLINOIS, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION 17, 30 
(2011), available at http://www.iardc.org/annualreport2011.pdf. 
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The associates employed by Davis & Goldberg were also subjected 
to policies that interfered with their adequate and professional 
representation of their clients.  These policies included the 
imposition of time limits or restrictions on the amount of time that 
they could spend with clients and on cases; the imposition of a quota 
system that required associates to open a specified number of files in 
a certain time period; and the imposition of a policy requiring 
associates not to return the phone calls of existing clients, so that the 
attorneys could free more time to sign new clients.49 
Jurisdictions have used Rule 5.1 to sanction managing partners for 
imposing an unmanageable caseload, including “establishing and 
maintaining a business model in which such ethical violations were 
likely to occur.”50  And the disciplinary process has been used to point 
out that it is not sufficient to have nice-sounding formal policies if 
ongoing culture or business practices undermine the formal policies.51 
If firms have aggressive business strategies that require high 
caseloads, the obligation to supervise should be higher.  The Supreme 
Court of Maryland said it well: 
[I]n some cases, a law firm’s culture inherently engenders a need for 
specific supervision regarding how to balance the lawyer’s 
obligations to clients within the business model of the firm.  This was 
the case at [the Kimmel & Silverman firm].  The firm culture at K & 
S strongly emphasized the number of filings, case turnaround, and 
revenue generated as the significant measures of associate success; 
not rare criteria, in and of themselves, but which, in an admittedly 
high-volume business model, carry added responsibilities for the 
supervision of associates.52  
And when a firm has notice of a lawyer’s prior error or serious 
emotional impairment, there would be a similar obligation of 
heightened supervision.53  In other words, ethical infrastructure 
 
 49. Davis v. Ala. State Bar, 676 So. 2d 306, 308 (Ala. 1996). 
 50. In re Phillips, 226 Ariz. 112, 114 (Ariz. 2010). 
 51. Id. at 115 (“The words in the firm’s policy manual prohibiting such conduct 
were insufficient to insulate managers and supervisors from ethical responsibility 
when the actual ongoing practices were to the contrary.”); see also Elizabeth 
Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm Regulation Debates, 33 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 119, 144-45 (2005) (arguing that how lawyers in a firm act is more important than 
what firms say about how their lawyers ought to act); Milton Regan, Moral Intuitions 
and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941, 942 (2007) (Enron had policies 
that “formally conveyed the importance of ethical behavior” but its business practices 
created “a poisonous culture that spawned disdain for legal and accounting rules, as 
well as for any broader conception of ethics.”). 
 52. Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Kimmel, 955 A.2d 269, 288 (Md. 2008). 
 53. See Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v. Warren, 34 A.3d 1103, 1113 (Me. 2011). 
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includes policies, practices, monitoring, and paying attention to those 
around us. 
While Rules 5.1 and 5.3 are an improvement over a regulatory 
approach that looks at lawyers as atomistic decision-makers, these 
rules are still a far cry from imposing sharper responsibility on 
managing lawyers to develop improved systems to reduce error and 
improve decision-making.  There is so much more that could be done.  
Could the disciplinary process be the basis for developing best 
practices, such as audits when lawyers bill at an excessive rate (e.g., 
3000 hours per year)?54  Perhaps the regulatory system could provide 
stronger protection of whistleblowers, which would give added 
incentive for institutions to monitor in-house activities.55  And while 
Rules 5.1 and 5.3 could continue to impose sanctions on the 
individual managing lawyer, a more stringent and perhaps more 
effective method would be to sanction the firm through a public 
censure or fine.  Unfortunately, Ted Schneyer’s call to discipline law 
firms has, as yet, been heard by only two states.56  The proposal to 
include sanctions on the firm for subordinate misconduct was initially 
recommended but ultimately rejected in the Ethics 2000 revisions.57  
In public defender offices it would be unfair to sanction supervisory 
attorneys for inadequate funding that results in excessive caseloads.  
 
 54. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Why Lawyers Are Different and Why We Are the 
Same: Creating Structural Incentives in Large Law Firms to Promote Ethical 
Behavior—In-House Ethics Counsel, Bill Padding, and In-House Ethics Training, 44 
AKRON L. REV. 679, 711–22 (2011). 
 55. See Thomas A. Kuczajda, Self Regulation, Socialization, and the Role of 
Model Rule 5.1, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 119, 119–20 (1998) (claiming that the 
duties imposed by 5.1 to self-regulate are vague and calling for explicit protection of 
whistleblowers); Alex B. Long, Whistleblowing Attorneys and Ethical 
Infrastructures, 68 MD. L. REV. 786, 802–05 (2009) (advocating protection of internal 
whistleblowers and criticizing the Rules for having no explicit duty on the part of the 
law firm to have an internal reporting system). 
 56. Bruce A. Green, Foreword—The Legal Ethics Scholarship of Ted Schneyer: 
The Importance of Being Rigorous, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 365, 369 (2011). 
 57. Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 470–71 
(2003); Lucian T. Pera, Grading ABA Leadership on Legal Ethics Leadership: State 
Adoption of the Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 OKLA. CITY 
U. L. REV. 637, 775–76 (2005) (“[The Ethics 2000 proposal to discipline law firms] 
met fierce opposition within the ABA, and Ethics 2000 ultimately withdrew this 
proposal, settling instead on language in Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3 that attempts to 
arm disciplinary counsel with tools to fix responsibility for a law firm’s failure to have 
appropriate systems in place to prevent violations of the rules on lawyers in firm 
management.”). 
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Some form of pressure on systems, however, is needed.58  If we wish 
to get to the root causes (which are often business failures), we should 
target the conditions that breed ethical violations. 
B. Improved Decision-Making 
In addition to formal regulatory incentives, a good deal of 
thoughtful work has focused on improving ethical infrastructure in 
law firms with the goal of improved decision-making.59  The 
development of in-house ethics counsel and training programs helps 
create an environment in which lawyers can more likely recognize 
ethical issues and engage in thoughtful and nuanced analysis.  As 
Elizabeth Chambliss has noted, certain business practices and 
conditions such as compensation structures and mobility, which affect 
ethical decision-making, could be up-front-and-center in the 
discussion of best business practices.60 
Along with work on ethical infrastructures, a rich body of 
scholarship has emerged on the psychology of decision-making and 
the cognitive distortions that impair our decision-making.61  Bringing 
these interdisciplinary insights from sociology and business to legal 
practice creates conditions that are likely to improve decision-
making.  The idea that systems are important in ethical decision-
making is increasingly integrated into other aspects of our justice 
system.  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines pertaining to 
organizations focuses on the importance of effective compliance 
programs.62  This is one of many factors that has spurred the growth 
of the compliance aspects of business, and is a growth area for 
 
 58. See generally Norman Lefstein, Excessive Public Defense Workloads: Are 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Adequate?, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 949 
(2011). 
 59. See sources cited supra note 42; see also Chambliss, supra note 51. 
 60. Chambliss, supra note 51, at 149–50. 
 61. A footnote cannot do justice to the literature. See, e.g., Donald C. 
Langevoort, Psychological Perspectives on the Fiduciary Business, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
995, 1002 (2011) (citing Jason Dana et al., Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room: 
Experiments Demonstrating an Illusory Preference for Fairness, 33 ECON. THEORY 
67, 69 (2007) (discussing “moral wiggle-room” and “ethical fading”)); Carol A. 
Needham, Listening to Cassandra: The Difficulty of Recognizing Risks and Taking 
Action, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2329 (2010); Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical 
Obedience by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 451, 470 (2007); Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: 
The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 223, 224 
(2004); Paul R. Tremblay, Moral Activism Manqué, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 127 (2002). 
 62. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8 (2011). 
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lawyers.63  This compliance-business focus is well-accepted in the 
business world, with the legal profession lagging behind.64 
The U.S. attorney regulatory systems, like many others around the 
world, are keeping close watch on the initiative in New South Wales, 
Australia (NSW) to expand the regulatory focus.65  In 2001, NSW 
allowed corporations to provide both legal and non-legal services, 
subject to some restrictions.66  The regulatory system implemented a 
requirement that these firms adopt “appropriate management 
systems” that would assure compliance with professional ethical 
obligations.67  This “management based regulation” requires that the 
firms engage in self-assessment on whether the firm has appropriate 
management systems for the following areas: 
- Negligence 
- Communication 
- Delay 
- Liens / File Transfers 
- Cost Disclosure / Billing Practices / Termination of Retainer 
- Conflict of Interests 
- Records Management 
- Undertakings 
- Supervision of Practice and Staff 
- Trust Account Regulations68 
The regulatory focus encourages firms to put in place the ethical 
infrastructure that supports competent and ethical practice.69  
Eschewing a checklist-type, process-oriented approach, the Office of 
 
 63. See H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s Compliance Oversight 
Responsibility in the Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 144 (2001) (“There is 
a growing body of guidance concerning the elements of an effective compliance 
program that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have strongly influenced.”). 
 64. See, e.g., id. 
 65. See Christine Parker et al., Regulating Law Firm Ethics Management: An 
Empirical Assessment of an Innovation in Regulation of the Legal Profession in New 
South Wales, 37 J.L. & SOC’Y 466 (2010). 
 66. See generally Practice Structures, L. SOC’Y NEW S. WALES, 
http://www.lawsociety.com.au/ForSolictors/practisinglawinnsw/practicestructures/ind
ex.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2012). 
 67. Parker et al., supra note 65, at 471. 
 68. Id. at 470. 
 69. Id. at 468. 
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Legal Services Commissioner adopted a “light touch ‘education 
towards compliance strategy.’”70 
Some of the areas for self-assessment target the common issues of 
competence and communication, which are clustered under “Problem 
No. 1” above.  Negligence, communication, delay, clear information 
on costs, billing and termination, and trust management all will 
reduce common errors.  Some of these categories are more likely to 
improve decision-making, which are clustered under “Problem No. 2” 
above.  A sharper process for identifying conflicts, establishing 
policies and best practices on undertakings, among other variables, 
are likely to improve decision-making among well-intentioned 
practitioners.71 
This focus on a management-based approach allows the firms to 
think creatively about how to achieve good management in the areas 
noted above.72  And there are indications that this approach is 
working to improve legal practice.  An empirical study of the new 
regulatory focus on self-assessment of the firm’s own compliance 
found that this management focus led to a large and statistically 
significant drop in client complaints.73  This management-based 
approach was “explicitly to act as a counter-balance to the fear of 
over-commercialization in the new ILPs.”74 
There are many caveats to broad scale use of the NSW approach.  
Our highly legalized U.S. system, with a heavy focus on process, may 
resist the deliberative self-assessment process.  The authors of the 
NSW study, Christine Parker, Tahlia Gordon, and Steve Mark, 
readily note the voice of cynics.75  But the underlying idea that 
creative management systems might improve ethics needs to be front-
and-center in our conversation.  We can no longer afford to embrace 
 
 70. Id. at 468, 470 (explaining the checklist process-oriented approach). 
 71. Susan Shapiro’s groundbreaking empirical analysis of conflicts demonstrates 
that good systems, good information and open communication within a firm allow 
conflicts to be seen and addressed, hopefully in a timely manner. See SUSAN 
SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES: CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LEGAL PRACTICE (2002). 
 72. Parker et al., supra note 65, at 495 (“Even though the ten objectives that form 
the basis of the self-assessment are reasonably basic, our findings suggest that the 
OLSC’s self-assessment process may well be guiding, encouraging, and requiring 
many practitioners consciously and systematically to think through practice 
management issues, including ethics management, for the very first time.”). 
 73. See id. at 485–93. 
 74. Id. at 497. 
 75. See id. at 477–78. 
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the “law or business” dichotomy described by Julius Cohen in his 
provocative title. 
C. Market and Competitive Forces That Encourage Ethical 
Infrastructure 
We know that market forces, such as strong competition for clients 
and pressure to maintain high billable hours, can create conditions 
that push aside professional values.76  But some market forces have 
pushed law firms and other practice settings to improve the ethical 
infrastructure of the practice.77  An increased risk management focus 
has caused many firms to improve practices that reduce the firm’s 
exposure to malpractice or other sanctions.78 
A single emphasis on risk management is insufficient, however.79  
The focus on risk management puts the primary goal as protecting the 
institution in which the lawyer operates, not protection of clients.80  
This may result in less communication (hiding errors) from clients 
and over-emphasis of risk.81  As Professor William Simon notes, law 
firms and legal practice settings have not taken the next step to 
embrace the quality-control movements that have yielded improved 
practices in medicine, aviation safety, and other fields.82  A 
commitment to quality improvement requires lawyers to worry less 
 
 76. See, e.g., Susan Saab Fortney, I Don’t Have Time to Be Ethical: Addressing 
the Effects of Billable Hour Pressure, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 305 (2003); Alva Hugh 
Maddox, Lawyers: The Aristocracy of Democracy or “Skunks, Snakes, and Sharks”?, 
29 CUMB. L. REV. 323, 332 (1999). 
 77. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics 
Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 
44 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 590 (2002) (describing help from malpractice insurers on loss 
prevention and ethics). 
 78. See George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss Prevention: A 
Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 305, 307 (1997) 
(“[L]egal malpractice insurers are increasingly serving as regulators of lawyer 
behavior . . . .”); John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 
48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 102 (1995) (“The time has come to consider legal 
malpractice law as part of the system of lawyer regulation.”). 
 79. See Stephan Landsman, The Risk of Risk Management, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2315 (2010); see also Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of 
Risk Management, 94 GEO. L.J. 1909 (2006). 
 80. Landsman, supra note 79, at 2316 (explaining that this focus of risk 
management is “bottom-line oriented”). 
 81. Id. at 2317–21 (discussing “overcautious, fear-mongering, adversarial model of 
risk management” in the medical context). 
 82. William H. Simon, Where Is the “Quality Movement” in Law Practice?, 2012 
WIS. L. REV. 387, 387 (2012). 
MCMORROW_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:49 PM 
474 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
about legal exposure (risk management) and more about constant 
self-improvement.  This is not an easy change for lawyers, many of 
whom spend their professional lives reducing legal risk for clients. 
A quality-control focus inevitably leads us back to the structure in 
which the lawyer offers services.  In the medical context, many errors 
“are due to systemic failures rather than the glaring and anomalous 
mistake of a single individual.”83  Attention to these business aspects 
of ethics also helps reduce the ethical blind spots that inevitably occur 
in our decision-making.84  Once again, however, a more respectful 
examination of the business insights into quality improvement open 
up additional avenues for improved professional practice. 
III.  PROBLEM THREE: THE INABILITY TO MATCH THE SURPLUS 
OF LAWYERS WITH UNMET LEGAL NEEDS 
A third, and more profound, failure of the legal profession is the 
inability to provide affordable legal services to address the vast unmet 
legal needs in our society,85 even at a time when we have a surplus of 
legal labor.86  A significant part of this conundrum is a business 
failure.  We have been unable to find a business model that can match 
the excess capacity with the unmet needs. 
This challenge occurs in part because of our social understanding 
of law and legal services as a public good.  We see the provision of 
courts and judges as a public good, to be funded from the common 
weal, and for some areas of representation such as indigent criminal 
 
 83. Landsman, supra note 79, at 2325. 
 84. See Paul R. Tremblay & Judith A. McMorrow, Lawyers and New 
Institutionalism, 25 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 568 (2012). 
 85. See generally George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class 
Access to Legal Services and What We Can Learn from the Medical Profession’s 
Shift to a Corporate Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 789–90 (2001); Deborah 
Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 369, 397 (2004).  Both the ABA and many states have attempted to quantify 
the reasons for and extent of unmet legal needs. See AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL NEEDS 
AND CIVIL JUSTICE, A SURVEY OF AMERICANS (1994); COMM. ON CIVIL JUSTICE—SUP. 
CT. OF GA. EQUAL JUSTICE COMM’N, CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW AND MODERATE 
INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN GEORGIA (2009), available at 
http://www.georgiacourts.org/files/LegalNeeds_Report_2010%20FINAL%20with%2
0ADDENDUM.pdf; TASK FORCE ON CIVIL EQUAL JUSTICE FUNDING—WASH. 
STATE SUP. CT., THE WASHINGTON STATE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS STUDY (2003), 
available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/content/taskforce/civillegalneeds.pdf. 
 86. See Leipold, supra note 35, at 1 (“[T]the entry-level job market [for lawyers] 
can only be described as brutal.”); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS 
1 (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ 
marketresearch/PublicDocuments/abalawyerdemographics2012.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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defense.87  We do not envision the vast remaining areas of legal 
services, including most civil legal services, as a public good that 
should be paid out of public funds.  Instead, these legal services are 
left to the market forces.88 
I appreciate that a broad proposition that we need to develop a 
workable business model to match supply and demand is not of much 
help in the implementation phase.  We have many areas of life where 
we can state the goal but fail in practice.  We all know the key to 
losing weight: eat less and exercise more.  Many of us have trouble 
bridging the gap between the goal and practice, but with weight loss 
we usually assume it is a personal failure or character flaw.  A more 
accurate analogy to our legal services may be investment strategies.  
We all know how to make money in the stock market: buy low and 
sell high.  We fail (or succeed) for multiple reasons, but the free 
enterprise system continues to experiment with business models that 
embrace a deeper understanding of the investment process and use 
that information to develop different investment strategies. 
Addressing unmet legal needs is obviously a complex problem that 
requires multi-tiered strategies.  Simplification of laws and 
streamlined procedures, expanded pro bono and better government 
support for legal services would all help.89  If our focus is primarily to 
expand affordable access, loosening of restrictions on unauthorized 
practice has long been on the table as a very credible strategy.90  But 
another credible path is to continue experimentation with different 
business models to allow lawyers to offer affordable and quality legal 
services to moderate-income individuals and still earn a living wage. 
Each of these strategies is interconnected.  One brilliant initiative 
was the development of the Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts 
(IOLTA) program to support legal services to low-income clients 
 
 87. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  A whole article could be 
written on this topic.  Because U.S. judges are overwhelmingly drawn from the ranks 
of the legal profession and continue to have residual regulation by that profession 
(e.g. they can be disbarred for misconduct as a judge), they are part of the legal 
profession even while serving as a judge. 
 88. See Harris & Foran, supra note 85, at 775 (“[R]ecent empirical surveys by bar 
associations tend to confirm that middle-class Americans often lack access to 
affordable legal services.”). 
 89. See Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531 (1994). 
 90. Id.; see also Deborah J. Cantrell, The Obligation of Legal Aid Lawyers to 
Champion Practice by Nonlawyers, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 884 (2004); Rhode, 
supra note 85, at 388. 
MCMORROW_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:49 PM 
476 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
through diverting interest in lawyer trust accounts.91  IOLTA 
programs exist in all states and in 2008 produced $263.4 million in 
grants throughout the country, which supports a (barely) living wage 
for civil legal services lawyers.92  IOLTA has generally worked well to 
provide some support for legal services, but is much less effective 
during times of economic slowdown and low interest rates.93 
Individual pro bono work is another strategy that has both a 
professional and business basis.  While Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 6.1 sets an aspirational goal to render at least fifty hours of 
pro bono legal services,94 New York is the first state to make fifty 
hours of pro bono work a mandatory condition to obtain a license to 
practice law.95  Anticipating pushback, this obligation is imposed on 
new entrants only.96  While we should not discount ethical reasons to 
pursue pro bono work, many large firms encourage pro bono to 
market their firms, recruit and train associates, change firm culture, 
and actually improve the bottom line.97  Smaller firms and solo 
practitioners often provide reduced cost or free legal services on a 
more informal basis.98  Possible regulatory incentives include allowing 
lawyers to use pro bono work as credit toward the mandatory 
continuing legal education requirement.99  Outside the attorney 
regulation context, creative proposals include allowing a tax 
deduction or credit for pro bono services out of state.100 
 
 91. Ray Worthy Campbell, Rethinking Regulation and Innovation in the U.S. 
Legal Services Market (Mar. 18, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2018056. 
 92. See Commission on Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts: Overview, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/interest_lawyers_trust_accounts/ 
overview.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2012). 
 93. See generally Dru Stevenson, Rethinking IOLTA, 76 MO. L. REV. 455 (2010) 
(analyzing some “output side” unconsidered consequences of IOLTA programs). 
 94. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2010). 
 95. N.Y. ST. BOARD L. EXAMINERS, http://www.nybarexam.org/ (reporting new 
fifty hour pro bono requirement) (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See ESTHER F. LARDENT, MAKING THE BUSINESS CASE FOR PRO BONO (2000); 
Jolie L. Justus, Using Business Strategies and Innovative Practices to Institutionalize 
Pro Bono in Private Law Firms, 72 UMKC L. REV. 365 (2003); see also CORP. PRO 
BONO, http://www.cpbo.org/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2012). 
 98. See Leslie C. Levin, Pro Bono Publico in a Parallel Universe: The Meaning of 
Pro Bono in Solo and Small Law Firms, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 699, 701 (2009). 
 99. See Elena Romerdahl, Note, The Shame of the Legal Profession: Why Eighty 
Percent of Those in Need of Civil Legal Assistance Do Not Receive It and What We 
Should Do About It, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1115 (2009). 
 100. Stevenson, supra note 93, at 477–78. 
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A more obvious business need is to find more cost-effective service 
delivery models.  More information and study has come from the 
disruption of the large firm market.101  The ABA has focused on cross 
border practice and technology changes in its most current Ethics 
20/20 project.102  Trends in disaggregation of legal services and 
increased competition present both challenges and opportunities and 
compel adjustments in the strategies for delivering legal services.103  
Innovation is now the trend. 
In our discussion of legal ethics and efforts to address unmet legal 
needs, a broad scale, unapologetic focus on the business of law is an 
important and honorable way to improve access to legal services.  In 
health services a creative non-profit, Management Sciences for 
Health, has a mission to “help[] managers and leaders in developing 
countries to create stronger management systems that improve health 
services for the greatest health impact.”104  Many recognize that we 
need similar creativity in the market for legal service, particularly in 
light of the increasing debt load and disrupted training path for entry-
level attorneys.105 
CONCLUSION: THE LAW-BUSINESS DICHOTOMY REVISITED 
We return to the false dichotomy between law as a business and 
law as a profession.  As Tom Morgan notes, lawyers “are economic 
actors, specially trained, but driven by all the vices and virtues of a 
capitalist economic system.”106  Russell Pearce noted well, however, 
 
 101. See, e.g., Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle: Economic 
Perspectives on the Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 102. The ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 was created in 2009 to review the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and U.S. lawyer regulation, with a focus 
on “advances in technology and global legal practice developments.” ABA Comm’n 
on Ethics 20/20, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
professional_responsibility/aba_commission_on_ethics_20_20.html (last visited Oct. 
18, 2012). 
 103. Burk & McGowan, supra note 101, at 93. 
 104. Our Mission, MGMT. SCI. FOR HEALTH, http://www.msh.org/about-us/ 
index.cfm (last visited Oct. 14, 2012). 
 105. The implementation challenges are vast.  Professor David Van Zandt from 
Northwestern projects a $65,000 break-even point. See David Lat, Changes in Legal 
Education: Some Thoughts from Dean David Van Zandt, ABOVE THE LAW, (Feb. 3, 
2010, 8:23 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/02/changes-in-legal-education-some-
thoughts-from-dean-david-van-zandt.  Prof. Herwig Schlunk projects a range. See 
Herwig Schlunk, Mamas 2011: Is a Law Degree a Good Investment Today? (Vand. 
L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 11-42, 2011). 
 106. THOMAS D. MORGAN, VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 25 (2010). 
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that “[m]ost of us are neither saints nor sinners.  We are not morally 
superior by virtue of being lawyers.  We are just like everyone else.  
We want to make money and we want to do good.”107 
The ability to make money needs to be accepted as more than a 
necessary evil in our discussion of professional conduct.  The very 
earliest colonial efforts to control lawyers went right to this business 
aspect.  Both the Massachusetts and Virginia colonies prohibited 
lawyers from receiving fees for representing others in court.108  Until 
very recently, veterans were unlikely to have a lawyer in the early 
stages of the benefit application process because it was a crime to 
accept more than $10 to represent a person in a Veterans Affairs 
claim.109  If you want to limit lawyer involvement, you do not need to 
kill all the lawyers, just cut off their ability to make a living wage. 
The core theme of this Article is that creative, unapologetic 
attention to the business of law will enhance ethics and 
professionalism.  As Gary Munneke noted, “the skills associated with 
organizing legal work and managing a practice are central to 
competent lawyering.  When lawyers practice proficiently and 
efficiently, then clients are well-served.  When clients are well-served, 
the system of justice is enhanced.”110  Readers certainly understood 
this, at least on an intuitive level, before reading this essay.  If we 
want to take a multi-tiered approach to improving professionalism, 
we must embrace the business of law. 
That being said, obvious concerns arise.  Julius Cohen reminds us 
of the limits of the business paradigm in our service business.  It is 
Economics 101 that we have regulation to counteract some forms of 
market failures.  We can argue about the scope and extent of market 
failures in the provision of legal services, and whether other market 
mechanisms such as malpractice, judicial sanctions and public 
shaming are sufficient to correct failures.  But there is a powerful 
need for some form of external professional obligations.111  Market 
 
 107. Russell Pearce, How Law Firms Can Do Good While Doing Well (and the 
Answer is Not Pro Bono), 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 211, 215 (2005). 
 108. William T. Gallagher, Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics of Self-
Regulation in the California State Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 485, 508 (1995); see also 
MORGAN, supra note 106, at 34. 
 109. Daniel R. Coquillette & Judith A. McMorrow, Zacharias’s Prophecy: The 
Federalization of Legal Ethics Through Legislative, Court, and Agency Regulation, 
48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 123, 141 (2011). 
 110. Munneke, supra note 27, at 1243. 
 111. See, e.g., James Spigelman, Are Lawyers Lemons? Competition Principles 
and Professional Regulation, 77 AUSTL. L.J. 44 (2003). 
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forces give less attention to the public, non-client based interests, 
which as we know is one primary justification for imposition of 
additional duties on lawyers.  These additional duties, such as 
avoiding conflicts and maintaining confidences and obligations to the 
courts, provide the value that lawyers add.112  Those are the duties 
that we impose to support the legal system and courts and that 
amorphous concept called “the rule of law.” 113 
At this point a reader might be quite frustrated, stating that the 
real question is defining the content of these additional duties, and 
how to assure that those who wish to use the title “lawyer” deliver the 
content.114  That question is one that the idea of the “professional” 
captures.  But the concept of “business” is just as vast and elastic as 
the word “profession.”115  It has affirmative and negative 
manifestations.  With the wave of a hand I can declare that we should 
focus on the positive aspects of a service business: core values, 
excellent service, good infrastructure, proper capitalization, clear 
business plan, efficiencies, cost controls, and employee development.  
In addition, we can make a powerful alignment with the field of 
business ethics, which challenges the concept that profit maximization 
is the dominant or only concern of business.  As a field, the legal 
profession can also draw lessons from the expanding and creative 
field of corporate social responsibility.116  These are our natural 
 
 112. See Scott L. Cummings, What Good Are Lawyers?, in THE PARADOX OF 
PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 1 (Scott L. Cummings 
ed., 2011). 
 113. In addition to a sharp understanding of the particular obligation of lawyers, 
including putting client needs above personal needs, a heavy emphasis on profit 
maximization results in significant stress on the daily lives of lawyers.  Some business 
models require high billable hours, provide less job security and impose greater 
stratification, all of which contribute to some levels of dissatisfaction. See NANCY 
LEVIT & DOUGLAS O. LINDER, THE HAPPY LAWYER: MAKING A GOOD LIFE IN THE 
LAW 53–58 (2010).  Lawyer satisfaction needs to be part of the discussion, just as 
employee development and satisfaction is an important dimension of business. 
 114. With all due respect to Professor Tom Morgan, I do not see professionalism as 
dead.  Maybe the word is just too fuzzy to capture the core values, or has been co-
opted and has too many meanings. See MORGAN, supra note 106, at 21 (“It should be 
acknowledged at the outset that the terms profession and professional are used 
almost promiscuously in our society, with little agreed-upon definition.”). 
 115. Neil Hamilton, The Profession and Professionalism Are Dead?: A Review of 
Thomas Morgan, The Vanishing American Lawyer (2010), 20 PROF. LAW. 14, 14–17 
(2010). 
 116. See generally KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: 
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE RESPONSIBILITIES (2006); Richard P. 
Nielsen, Organization Theory and Ethics: Varieties and Dynamics of Constrained 
Optimization, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATION THEORY: META-
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intellectual allies in the effort to have an integrated approach to 
improving lawyer ethics and conduct. 
Scott Cummings describes this as the dual status of lawyers “in the 
market, but above it.”117  This professional paradox, as he notes, is 
complex, and “we know that different lawyers, at different times, in 
different places” stand for a different balance between the profit 
goals and justice.118  I do not see the business aspects of legal services 
as bad or as the enemy.  To provide legal services, lawyers must be 
good business people as well.  Ask any board member of any non-
profit legal services provider. 
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